Whose Environmental Standards? Clarifying the Issues of Our Common Future

A report of the first meeting of
the U.S.-Japan Task Force on the Environment

Carnegie Council
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Table of Contents

About the Project / 1

I. The Role of Ethics / 2

II. *The First Global Revolution* and the Roles of the United States and Japan / 4

III. Who Has Set the Standards? A History of Environmental Diplomacy / 6

IV. What's at Stake? / 9

  Stakeholders in American and Japanese Environmental Policy / 9

  What's at Stake for the U.S.-Japan Relationship / 15

  What's at Stake for Humanity / 17

V. The United States and Japan: A Global Environmental Partnership? / 18

VI. Conclusions / 20

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About the Project

Analysts on both sides of the Pacific recognize the vital and pivotal role a United States-Japan partnership can play in addressing global environmental problems. This Carnegie Council project aims to enhance all of the ongoing efforts to assemble an action program through a systematic examination of the ethical principles underlying environmental policy decisions in both countries. By focusing on Japan and the United States, the project effectively brings to a more manageable forum the ethical issues raised at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).

The organizers believed that such a study is particularly needed at a time when the tensions in U.S.-Japan bilateral relations continue unabated and when rhetoric surrounding the relationship points to doubts about the existence of a shared moral vision. The study was designed to fuel a fruitful policy debate about American and Japanese leadership roles and responsibilities as well as the U.S.-Japan relationship itself, and about opportunities for both countries to work to find solutions to shared environmental problems in a rapidly changing context for the conduct of international relations.

On April 6-7, 1992 thirty-four international environment specialists, political scientists, U.S.-Japan policy analysts, and business leaders gathered at the Carnegie Council to begin this exploration under the theme, "Whose Environmental Standards?" Participants were asked to address the concerns of those who believe that U.S.-Japan cooperation on the environment is key to resolving many of today's environmental crises, to focus upon the motivations and assumptions upon underlying policy decisions in each country, and to consider the impact of power politics on past and emerging policy.

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I

The Role of Ethics

No inquiry into the appropriate assignment of roles and responsibilities is complete without a serious examination of the normative assumptions that each country brings to this question. Normative perspectives have been a concern for scholars and policymakers alike in both the United States and Japan, where notions of progress are being questioned and the need to reorder values asserted. In Japan, a report on the environment by the Advisory Panel on Environment and Culture, issued by the Environment Agency, is largely devoted to an assessment of moral priorities. The report reads:

> In recent years, there has been a trend toward creating values that are compatible with the natural environment and going back to a more natural lifestyle.... The problem amounts to a redefinition of human life, in both material and spiritual terms.... We are seeing symptoms of change in the way we live, a transformation from a "delicious" life to an "ethical" life.[1]

The authors express concern over the indiscriminate manner in which Japan adopted Western values throughout the twentieth century.

> The modern era has seen the unchecked social adoption of an exaggerated version of Western attitudes toward nature without proper digestion of the basic logic behind them.[2]

Traditional notions of progress, growth, development, and equality are undergoing close examination and revision in the United States as well. Over the past several years, numerous groups have been formed and conferences convened to evaluate new environmental paradigms.[3] The question of whether environmental solutions can be discerned from the ethical traditions of the West is a principal concern to these scholars. Russell Hardin of the University of Chicago has argued that reigning moral and political theories in the West do not accomodate the environmentalist mandate of duties to future generations and therefore need to be reexamined.[4] Authors J. Baird Callicott and Roger Ames have devoted a book to a discussion of the possibility of adopting non-Western views of nature as a remedy for the ecological crisis.[5] Eugene Hargrove, editor of *The Journal of Environmental Ethics* and widely considered to be the founder of the discipline of environmental ethics, has argued that traditions that allow for the development of an environmental ethic do exist in Western philosophy.[6]

Today, not only professional environmentalists but also many government leaders, academics, and even business leaders around the globe are appealing for a "new environmental ethic." Their actions and statements reflect the need to redress the spiraling degradation of the ecosphere, reduce consumption, and narrow the widening discrepancies in standards of living worldwide. A prominent voice in the United States today is Vice President Al Gore. In the introduction to his bestseller, *Earth in the Balance*, he writes:

> I have come to believe that the world's ecological balance depends on more than just our ability to restore a balance between civilization's ravenous appetite for resources and the fragile equilibrium of the earth's environment; it depends on more, even, than our ability to restore a balance between ourselves as individuals and the civilization we aspire to create and sustain.... The more deeply I search for the roots of the global environmental crisis, the more I am convinced that it is an outer manifestation of an inner crisis that is, for lack of a better word, spiritual.[7]

The call of Gore and others is for new collective values or normative standards to improve decision making and thereby curb over-consumption of resources, redirect capital flows, improve equitable distribution of environmental technologies, reduce waste and preserve biodiversity.

What do we mean by "normative standards," and what role do they play in the environmental question? Normative standards are the foundations of ethical decision making. They imply a shared world view for a new world order—a common frame of reference based on international moral agreement. In interstate relations, they are prescriptive "rules of the game" agreed to in both theory and practice. But as Joel Rosenthal, Carnegie Council director for Education and Studies, explains,

> Normative standards are not "received" in a benign or passive fashion: they are usually the result of some great struggle. The struggle over norms is usually a struggle for power and interests as much as a struggle over ideology. For better or worse—usually both—norms reflect power considerations. Naturally, those in power are those who make the rules, sometimes at the expense of weaker elements of society.[8]

In the search for a new world order, in place of the centrifugal force of East-West conflict to guide international relations, many have claimed the environment—"a good issue, something that no one can be against, which doesn't have all that downside of war, destruction, violence, and arms races"[9]—to be the new organizing force of the global community. Yet such statements are distorting, grossly understating the contentious nature of available policy alternatives.

To say that the environment is a "good issue" is to ignore the difficult yet relatively unpublicized battles being fought over the issue on multiple fronts: not only in the United Nations and other multinational institutions but also in Washington and Tokyo (and at least 170 other capital cities around the world); not only on Capitol Hill and in Kasumigaseki but also within government agencies; not only between business people and environmentalists but between and within environmental groups, among business organizations, and inside board rooms.

The reality of standard setting, or the "struggle," as Rosenthal describes it, is that there are

competing interests at stake, and thus winners and losers. In the field of the environment, "sustainable development" sets up both the fundamental tension between environmental protection and economic growth, and the challenge for legislators who are charged with making the allocative and regulatory decisions over who pays, who receives, and who does not. Establishing mechanisms and regimes to make those decision involves politics. And discovering the rationale for these decisions, rationale that is often a mix of political interest and personal and collective belief, is what the normative inquiry is all about.

Many observers have asserted the potential of U.S.–Japan cooperative leadership in environmental protection, be it through joint financing, technology transfer, or by together establishing norms and standards by which these activities will be carried out. The Task Force held up all assumptions for examination, and left open the question of whether the premise of U.S.–Japan cooperative leadership on the environment is conceptually sound. Can two competing nations both serve themselves and help the world at the same time? Which nation's industries are going to benefit? Can we talk about such issues, which are fundamentally North-South issues, without inclusion of the South? There is a need to consider seriously where it is in the interest of the planet for Northern countries to "consolidate" or "harmonize" standards, and where it is not.

The UNCED meeting of 1992 was critical because it marked the beginning of a process of forming international consensus, whereby competing interests were confronted. The negotiations raised serious questions of fairness and the rights (to technology, to financial resources, to a clean environment) and responsibilities (national and global) of nations. Now, with the conference behind us, significant differences remain over how to define the keyword for global environmental policy, "sustainable development," perpetuating divisions among competing stakeholders in the North and the South. Perhaps no environmental conflict demonstrates this more poignantly than the rivalry between the Swiss rainforest activist Bruno Manser and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir over whether to halt logging in the Malaysian jungle and thereby respect and preserve indigenous culture, or to continue logging, which can bring foreign exchange and the hope of economic development.

The ethical inquiry requires clarification of underlying normative assumptions and an examination of the ways and means that policy actors rationalize priorities. In the words of Carnegie Council President Robert Myers, ethics can serve "as referee in educating the competing factions and reducing the clashes to a humane and hopefully solvable level."[10]

II

The First Global Revolution[11] and the Roles of the United States and Japan

> We are in the early stages of the formation of a new type of world society which will be as different from today's as was that of the world ushered in by the Industrial Revolution from the society of the long agrarian period that preceded it....the magnitude of [global environmental changes] amounts to a major revolution on a world-

wide scale.

With these words, Bertrand Schneider, secretary general of the Club of Rome, opened the Task Force meeting. His keynote address offered a vivid picture of the new global context within which American and Japanese environmental actions should be judged, as well as of the changing paradigm for the conduct of international relations.

The reasons why Japan and the United States are critical players in the emerging "revolution" require little explanation; they lie in the extraordinary economic, political, and cultural influence of the two nations. As the two largest economies in the world, their influence is unparalleled. The "common but differentiated responsibility" principle of the Rio Declaration, a statement of principles on environment and development hammered out by UNCED negotiators, refers to the expectation that countries contribute proportionally according to their economic capability. This has come to be considered one of the basic norms of environmental rights and responsibilities governing nation-states.

At UNCED, the powerful role of the United States was evident in participating countries' acquiescence to U.S. demands for a weaker climate change treaty as an implicit condition for President Bush's participation at Rio. Given Washington's relative conservatism on the full range of global environmental issues addressed during the UNCED process, the world turned to Japan to provide the necessary funding to ensure sustainable development.

Some observers argue that Northern countries are obliged to transfer financial and technological resources and know-how to Southern countries, both as global stewards and, given the ecological destruction that their industrial development has wrought, out of a sense of justice. Environmental destruction associated with American and Japanese activity is, by some measures, higher than for any other nation. For example, the United States is the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide, with Japan ranking fifth. In addition, both countries have indiscriminately consumed tropical timber without regard for sustainable management; the consumption of non-renewable resources results in degradation of the forests and a consequent decline in biodiversity. Environmentalists argue that it is not a question of what Northern countries like Japan and the United States *want* to do, but what their responsibility for the current state of ecological destruction dictates they do that should determine policy.

The two societies have produced consumerist cultures of luxurious living standards to which much of the rest of the world aspires. Leaders of both countries, in determining global responsibilities, also need to reassess the worldviews embodied in their socioeconomic systems and the values that sustain policies, and to consider the impact of the culture beyond their borders. At the Task Force meeting, both Japanese and American participants wondered whether the conservative approach of the United States at Rio reflects an American society too comfortable with its lifestyle to fully comprehend the environmental imperatives of a sustainable earth. On the other hand, is Japan, characterized as a comparatively frugal culture, better equipped for sustainable living? Koichiro Fujikura, professor of environmental law at Tokyo University, expressed doubt about whether Japanese traditions are serving Japanese society today, saying, "In the face of industrializa-

tion any traditional values [Japan] might have had—an Asian quality of identifying with nature—were lost."

Some Task Force members asserted that the application of American creative and intellectual powers to create and promote a new global culture has "great potential." Yet, without political will that potential may be lost. How can Japan and the United States work together to bolster their political will to be global environmental leaders? The answer to this question depends upon the ability of Japan and the United States to overcome mutual distrust, to blunt cynicism on environmental questions, and to develop a meaningful dialogue.

III

Who Has Set the Standards?
A History of International Environmental Policymaking

As the first step in understanding the politics of standard setting—the diplomatic context within which Japan and the United States must act—the Task Force examined the history of international environmental policymaking. Who—what country, institution, interest group—set the environmental standards in the past, and what are the implications for future standard setting?

Allen Springer, professor of international law at Bowdoin College, prefaced his remarks on this subject explaining that it is difficult, and possibly dangerous, to draw clear lessons from the past about international environmental standard setting given: a) the very different levels from which issues have been approached (transboundary bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, quasi-parliamentary arenas such as CITES and the International Whaling Commission, regional management programs such as those that have evolved at the United Nations); and, b) the varied makeup of the negotiating teams, which previously were heavily comprised of technical experts, and more recently have become more politicized by the greater participation of non-scientific, political experts. According to Springer, the kinds of driving ethos and the kinds of negotiations of the past are quite different from what we are likely to be engaged in the future. Furthermore, the institutions that developed those principles do not respond with the kind of speed and clarity that is demanded today.

Many of the agreements negotiated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (e.g., the Convention on the Rhine of 1868 dealing with the crowded waterways of Europe, the Fur Seals Convention of 1911, the European Convention of the Protection of Birds Important to Agriculture of 1902) are characterized by the introduction of scientific expertise and a strong emphasis on the depoliticization of issues. They were primarily designed to remove from the political table issues that were perceived to be of a rather localized nature—generally an economic concern—and to avoid their intrusion in undesirable ways into the "normal" relations of the states involved.

After World War II, much of the global focus on environmental problems took place within the framework of the evolving specialized agencies of the UN system. The approach taken

by each agency (e.g., the International Maritime Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the Food and Agricultural Organization) tended to differ as did the capabilities to take decisive action. Springer noted that the 1968 "Man and the Biosphere" conference organized by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was the beginning of an effort to merge the somewhat disparate efforts of the United Nations, and made it "appropriate to talk about the biosphere as an organizing concept."

The watershed conference was the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment of 1972. This effort, initiated and controlled by developed countries, was the product of: a) concerns of developed countries about the pollution levels they were experiencing as a result of industrialization; b) concern for the impact on trade competitiveness of new environmental measures taken nationally; c) concern that polluting industries might find their way to developing countries, a condition that would not only have deleterious consequences for the environments of developing countries, but also would ultimately mean competition for the United States and other advanced countries in some key industries; and d) hopes for an opportunity to create an international environmental protection agency, like the one which was being developed in the United States at the time, that would have the ability to perform impact assessments, particularly with regard to international projects, to enact regulations, and to impose and enforce standards.

What many people in developed countries didn't recognize at the time was that developing countries would respond to this agenda in a very different way. There were many developing countries who were intimidated and concerned about what seemed to be a new agenda being hoisted upon them. There was concern about the impact on trade. Would developing countries be denied access to the markets of developed countries? There was a concern about the impact on aid flows. Would aid be linked in ways that would be detrimental to autonomous decision making by developing states? There was concern about technology. Would the new technologies be too expensive and would they reflect the needs of the developing countries?

The establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was one of the principal products of Stockholm. But, at least from the standpoint of many American environmentalists, it was a disappointment. For some, locating the UNEP in Nairobi suggested that it wouldn't be linked effectively to the other specialized agencies of the United Nations that would play a key role in making the system work. It was a weak agency, a catalytic rather than a coercive body, and there was the sense that somehow politics had intruded on a good idea, and that the opportunity to develop an effective and equitable governing body had been lost.

Since Stockholm, a number of trends can be noted: First, there has been an increasing emphasis on regional approaches to environmental problems whenever appropriate. Second, there has been a "greening" of other international organizations, including NATO, OECD, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of American States (OAS). Third, there is a growing recognition on the part of developing countries of the importance of environmental issues. Fourth, there has been a proliferation of both negotiating arenas and

international agreements. Fifth, environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) have become more important, not only in terms of the influence they have on their home governments, but also in terms of their work internationally.

To characterize generally environmental negotiations, power has often been a function of the control a nation has over a resource. For example, whaling states have controlled the creation of standards in the International Whaling Commission, and nations with distant water or shipping interests have controlled the conventions on marine pollution of the International Maritime Organization. Standards have generally first been derivative of national compromise, through the process of domestic politics or the recognition that domestic industries will be able to take economic advantage of international restrictions (as with the United States' chlorofluorocarbon industry's response to the Montreal Protocol).

As a result, Springer concluded, it is questionable whether what has come out of these international fora can be valued as "environmental standards." Most international agreements have been non-binding statements of principle that have relied on the "lowest common denominator," and have involved little coercive international supervision. The standards have generally been set by the most powerful states, which have relied on their economic power to reward those who participate and punish those who do not. In short, international processes are important, but primarily in disseminating information, focusing attention on environmental problems, and providing arenas for ENGOs to articulate their concerns and demand public justification for policy decisions.

Lawrence Susskind, professor of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT, where he teaches a course on international environmental negotiations, emphasized the need to reform the global environmental treaty-making process. He echoed Springer in asserting that the system can be improved through regionalization. The Maastricht Treaty of the European Community and its reference to the environment foreshadow a worldwide trend towards harmonization of standards by region first, which can then facilitate global harmonization. Susskind argued that although agreement within ethnically, economically and politically diverse regions is no easy accomplishment, regionalism is clearly a more manageable and viable approach than larger UNCED-type conferences based on national representation. Furthermore, in a regional negotiating arrangement, monitoring, compliance and enforcement are within easier reach.

Koichiro Fujikura of Tokyo University pointed to the Japanese experience with standard-setting as a possible model for global standard-setting. Following the period of the 1950s and 1960s when Japan experienced severe air and water pollution, the Japanese government responded to the cries of victims (and of industry, which was being charged liable for negligence by the courts in all cases brought before it) with the introduction of a compensation system. This system provided a national fund for health damages, set standards and certified victims, designated heavily polluted areas, identified pollution sources, and assigned charges to polluters. In addition to significant reductions in pollutants in Japan, there were a number of unanticipated benefits of the compensation approach: improving data gathering on the health effects of pollution; legitimizing reparations for victims; and providing social accounting of the cost of industrial progress. Having developed a relatively

successful system in Japan, it is worth considering whether this system should be internationalized. And should this approach be applied to property damage as well as human health?

Fujikura concluded that ethical standards are born of experience, a more critical factor in determining and strengthening environmental norms than often indeterminate scientific findings. Other participants expressed concern that the kinds of global environmental problems we face today, such as global warming and loss of biodiversity, depend upon preventative measures—the precautionary principle—which countries may find hard to practice. To avert irreversible damage countries, including Japan and the United States, need to adapt their policy-making mechanisms and institutions to ensure necessary and appropriate responses.

An ethical standard related to process that is evolving around the globe, for which the United States is often credited, is the inclusion of ENGOs in the standard-setting process. The growth of capacity-building networks of ENGOs represents a widespread recognition that governments do not necessarily speak solely and exclusively for their citizens.

IV

What's at Stake?

Stakeholders In American And Japanese Global Environmental Policy

> Today everyone is trying to set standards: the business community, just as national governments, is trying to set standards; multilateral agencies, including the International Standards Organization, are trying to set standards; business organizations and individual countries are trying to set standards that would be applied worldwide as well as provide models for other organizations.[12]

In an effort to analyze the competing interests that define the fault lines of the normative-standards struggle over the environment today, this portion of the seminar delved into three questions: What are the stakeholder groups in each country and how are the stakes defined? What is at stake for the U.S.-Japan relationship? What is at stake for humanity?

In setting environmental standards there are, generally speaking, three principal stakeholder groups vying to assert their interests: business, government, and NGOs. These groups are not monolithic, but have a complex makeup. Comparisons between Japan and the United States of the character of each stakeholder group and the relationships among them reveals the political dynamics of environmental policy making and lays the groundwork for understanding the interplay of ethical and political considerations. The following is a distillation of Task Force discussions based on the statements and comments of the participants of the first meeting, who are themselves representatives and observers of the

stakeholders in each society.

Business

The business sector has perhaps the greatest stake in setting clear and achievable standards. As the primary target of regulatory measures, businesses need to know to what standards they will be held accountable in order to plan production, marketing, and distribution efficiently. In addition, businesses are increasingly being called upon to acknowledge their duties as "corporate citizens," to contribute to healthy societies on which they depend. In the age of global environmental issues, business must respond to both domestic and international law.

Lawrence Susskind added that in the future multinational corporations will play a key role in international standard setting by "privatizing" the treaty-making process. Businesses in most developed nations have realized that there is security in knowing what the standards are. Paradoxically, as the trend toward globalization of industrial activities continues, multinational corporations will likely take the lead in arguing for certain *high* standards, and to get them set for periods of at least ten years before they have to be reviewed again on a worldwide basis.

John Shlaes, executive director of the Global Climate Coalition, a business group, explained why American corporations have found it essential to be involved in environmental issues such as climate change. First, climate change is a long-term and complex issue that will continue to engage the attention of international organizations and nation-states. Second, the issue has inspired a debate about policies that have important domestic and international implications for business. In fact, environmental issues have become the focal point of international debate about the future of the international "playing field"; they encompass questions of international regulation, North-South equity, the role of the United Nations, international economic competitiveness, and the role of ENGOs, all of which will have an impact on business.

In Japan, as Kenzo Sugiura of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) explained, business assumed a major role in environmental matters well before the rise of global environmental issues. He quoted a 1976 report of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) that declared a "victory" for Japan in its efforts to combat pollution. He attributed the success to three factors. First, Japanese firms have a long-term view of social obligation. Second, a shortage of land for residences and the resulting crowded conditions in Japan exacerbated the health effects of pollution and heightened the urgency to act. Third, a dearth of indigenous natural resources, especially energy resources, led to more efficient resource use. In terms of global environmental activity, specific actions the electric utility industry can take in the future toward reducing global warming should include, according to Sugiura: developing more nuclear power; increasing the use of renewable resources like solar and wind energy; and instituting "no regrets" efficiency and conservation gains.

In comparing the statements of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Keidanren, Japan's most powerful business organization, differences in attitudes toward the role of business in protecting the environment are striking. The Japanese document states:

> Today's environmental problems are too critical to be dealt with solely through measures to prevent industrial pollution.... We must radically revise various social and economic systems, such as the layout of cities and the arrangement of transport networks, and we must also upgrade social infrastructure and, indeed, raise the consciousness of the citizenry.[13]

The Keidanren report finds the following international problems worthy of attention: global warming, the depletion of tropical rain forests, desertification, acid rain, and the pollution of the oceans.[14] It reads: "By showing that it takes environmental problems seriously, the business world can gain the trust and sympathy of the public. This will foster a mutually beneficial relationship between producers and consumers, thereby encouraging the healthy development of the economy."[15] The progressive attitude indicated here is remarkable in contrast to that exhibited by Keidanren's counterpart, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The 1992 report of the Chamber, the world's largest federation of businesses, demonstrates little concern for global environmental problems.[16] With climate change and other issues, scientific uncertainty is emphasized and the postponement of remediation measures until their impact is proven advised. In sum, Keidanren's statement of concern over the magnitude of potential environmental problems is lacking.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce does not constitute the only business voice in the United States. One finds a substantially different, more activist environment statement in the literature of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, whose membership of 285 companies (in comparison to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's roughly 200,000) consists of large multinationals.[17] In fact, environmental positions of American businesses vary significantly depending upon whether the business is a multinational corporation, heavily reliant upon international markets and therefore sensitive to international regulatory developments, an extractive industry, such as fishing or mining, or a company dependent primarily upon domestic markets such as a food processing industry or a pharmaceutical manufacturer. On global warming, for example, it is easy to see why the coal industry fights against strict measures that natural gas companies fervently support.

Is the variance in environmental policies among businesses wider for the United States than for Japan, where there may be greater coordination among industries and more developed mechanisms for public-private partnerships? If so, what impact does this have on national and global environmental policy, on trade competitiveness, and on prospects for policy coordination and standard setting?

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs)

The theoretical counterweight to the business role in environmental politics is the environmental movement, active in both Japan and the United States. In the United States, the

effectiveness of the environmental movement is sometimes diluted by divisions within the movement over means and ends. In Japan, the environmental movement is characteristically weak, a condition largely attributable to the systematic exclusion of environmental groups from the consensus-building policy process.

In addition to different levels of empowerment, Japanese and American ENGOs differ in terms of organizational mandate and scope. In Japan, ENGOs (the first citizens' movements) were first organized during the pollution crises of the 1950s and 1960s by victims demanding legislative and compensatory responses for damages to health. Today, generally speaking, Japan's environmental groups remain small, grassroots organizations, poorly funded and run largely by the efforts of housewives. Organizations such as the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (which addresses issues such as Japan's polluting industries in Southeast Asia) and the Japan Action Tropical Timber Network (whose mandate is to monitor Japanese timber company activities overseas) aside, the majority of these environmental groups remain focused on environmental issues such as industrial pollution or parks preservation that have a direct effect on the physical health and well-being of Japanese people. Japanese ENGO concern with the environment beyond Japan's borders is a more recent development; increasingly, groups are linking up with organizations overseas that share similar environmental and health concerns as a means of strengthening their forces and attracting international attention to their cause.

Aside from insuring the establishment of and industry compliance to stricter environmental standards, political power is at stake for environmental groups. Grassroots organizations of Japan face the challenge of how to delicately balance independence and cooperation with government and business so as to have an impact yet avoid governmental control. The citizens movements of the 1960s were remarkably persistent in their appeals to the government for action. More recently, as the government recognizes the need to have an indigenous ENGO movement to support its claim to global leadership, it has begun to help certain groups with financial and institutional support. This calls for a new ENGO strategy to accomodate this situation; the fundamental choice is either to work with a more environmentally engaged government and industry and risk compromising objectives, or to remain steadfast in ideals by standing up firmly to polluters and risk losing a voice in the process.

Naturally, both strict environmental standards and access to political power are also at stake for many American environmental groups. In the United States there are ten to fifteen large, well-funded national organizations, all of which have developed a strong presence in Washington. These groups have long maintained a strong concern with issues of environmental preservation and nature conservation, have strong research capabilities, and sustain a large membership that sometimes includes corporate contributors. In recent years their international departments have expanded as have their scientific and economic research capabilities in the area of global environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity. It is from these more powerful nationals that individuals were drawn for the American delegation to UNCED.

Those Japanese groups looking for alliances within the United States may find their counterparts among the American local grassroots organizations, which have a significantly

greater proportion of people of color and women leaders and which work for the health and safety concerns of the local, often poor communities. Grassroots groups in the United States have become increasingly critical of the mainstream, which they argue has capitulated to business interests and Washington politics in an effort to maintain political access. It may be partly because of the political dominance of the large national groups, which generally emphasize conservation over the health effects of pollution, that the U.S. Congress has not enacted specific legislation for victims groups as the Japanese Diet did in the 1970s.

Government

The environment is an integrating discipline that lies at the intersection of national security and international trade, two major objectives around which international relations is organized. The policy positions of government representatives to international negotiations are products of considerations of both the will of their constituents to endure the costs associated with environmental and economic policy changes and the geopolitical imperatives of foreign relations. The fundamental challenge for governments developing policy is to balance national interests and global responsibilities.

Japan has been alert to demonstrations of international concern for the environment. In 1988, following strong public expressions of environmental interest by foreign leaders, notably former British Prime Minister Thatcher and former Soviet President Gorbachev, and the swift development of a global consensus on ozone protection at Montreal, there was a marked surge of environment-related activity by the Japanese government.

Current levels of government environmental protection activity and awareness of environmental problems are higher than ever in Japan.[18] In 1992, there were three environmental bills being considered in the Diet, in contrast to the previous ten years when there was only one bill each year, according to Koya Ishino of the Japanese Environment Agency. Furthermore, since 1989, global environmental problems have received serious government attention, as demonstrated by the establishment of the Ministers' Council on Global Environmental Conservation and by the dramatic increase of funds earmarked for the research and development of global environmental technologies. Also in 1989, the government pledged $2.2 billion for environmental assistance to developing countries, and played host to a major international conference.[19]

Given mounting pressure on Japan to assume a greater world leadership role and the constitutionally-imposed limits to overseas military deployment, many in Japan have come to regard its contributions to environmental remediation as a means—if not *the* means—by which Japan can reconcile itself with the international community. In June 1989, the Japanese government held a conference with environment ministers from six Asian countries. There, only seven days after Noboru Takeshita had stepped down from office due to political scandal, the new prime minister, Sosuke Uno, gave his first public address, in which he said, "Noboru Takeshita had been very enthusiastic about environmental problems. My cabinet will give it even higher priority."[20] The preface of a policy paper prepared for the First Cabinet-Level Meeting on Environmental Protection on June 30, 1989 reads:

> Having developed a high level of economic growth largely linked to the global environment, Japan has the benefit of superior pollution control technology. As such, we now must take an international stand in responding to these problems as a "Japan contributing to the world."[21]

There are, generally speaking, two major issues at stake for Japan: First, Japanese foreign relations, in terms of whether it will successfully meet the expectations of both the West and the South. Second, the international competitiveness of Japanese industry in a new, more ecologically conscious global market. That these two goals—meeting global expectations and seizing economic opportunity—are often incompatible points to a source of internal conflict for Japan when setting a policy agenda. While other countries, including the United States, share this challenge, it is intensified in Japan by a highly skeptical international community that sees as unlikely the prospect for a characteristically insular Japan to make sacrifices for the common good. Japan must be careful not to allow the international perception of commercial motivation undermine its diplomatic resolve.

In a substantive summary of Japan's environmental policies, Koya Ishino argued that the process by which Japan's activity on global environmental issues has accelerated demonstrates that the pecuniary benefits of technology are not the only factors driving Japan's environmental policy. Ishino argued that in a number of government task forces and working groups officials, together with independent scholars, writers, and environmentalists, have taken a closer look at environmental themes and considered how they should be incorporated into policy. Those themes include: balancing the interests of current and future generations; acting in the face of uncertainty; ensuring global cooperation in order to avoid free-rider problems; reevaluating the international economic system in light of new environmental imperatives; making institutions more responsive to environmental crises; and developing technologies that respond to policy imperatives, rather than allowing policy to follow technological developments. Ishino said that while Japan does not deny the importance of technology it does recognize the limits of a "techno-fix" approach and the need to reevaluate the cultural behavior which underlies economic activities and lifestyles. It remains to be seen how such considerations will be manifest as policy and whether those policies will satisfy the international community.

If international respect is what Japan seeks in its offer of global environmental leadership, what motivates an American response to the environmental crisis? Michael Kraft, professor at the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay, believed American motivation was weak and saw few signs that the U.S. Government under President Bush was prepared to move forward. He explained that the forces driving U.S. policy have been largely outmoded worldviews or political ideologies, unrealistic attitudes toward economic growth and material prosperity, political and institutional incentives that have resulted in weighing short-term economic and political costs far more heavily than long-term ecological benefits and in decision-making structures that have failed to promote ecological rationality.

Historically, environmental policy generally has been given a low priority within some of the

most powerful of federal government agencies, namely the White House and the Department of Defense. This has been possible because of the broad but shallow support for the environment, widely considered a "low salience issue." Even though recent polls indicate strong public backing for environmental protection, the issues cannot compete with economic and security goals, especially during times of economic recession. Environmental initiatives are frequently inhibited because of concern over real or alleged economic costs and anticipated adverse impacts on American businesses, workers, and consumers. For this reason, environmental policy-making falls short of the rational ideal.

A number of participants commented on the "about-face" position of the United States in recent years with regard to international standards. In the past, especially through the United Nations, the United States was the leader: it set norms, created declarations, and codified American aspirations as expressions of global consensus. Today, however, there is a growing perception worldwide that the United States has lost the leadership it commanded twenty years earlier at Stockholm, that it is neither helping the effort to propose useful reforms nor building capacity in networks with other countries. During negotiations on the Rio Declaration, the United States insisted that the statement of principles be nonbinding. The EC provided the strongest backing for the Declaration and Japan led the way in providing a list of suggestions for institutional arrangements. In the worst case—and many Task Force participants argued that climate change is such a case—the United States was an obstacle to effective collective action. This policy, they argued, is a mistake; the United States should regard it in its interest to take a more proactive role and to urge a sharing of information internationally.

Some American Task Force participants representing government and industry countered that at Rio the United States was trying to take the lead on the emerging international norms, which are born out of the very principles that the United States stands for: human rights, democracy, and rule of the law. They cited the American lead in supporting ENGO participation in the negotiations as evidence of American endorsement of a grassroots, bottom-up approach to standard setting. To the United States, the problem was in implementation. At Rio, it was argued, politics intervened into the negotiating process, lending the appearance that, in the case of global warming, setting targets and timetables for carbon dioxide reduction was a moral norm, when in fact it was a function of politics. The issue of climate change, for example, came to the fore with such force largely because it was a convenient vehicle for many agendas. It was premature, these Americans argued, to adopt some of the measures endorsed by other nations at UNCED. Before implementation there must be greater coherence among environmental values as they relate to trade, security, and economic values. Given this situation, real leadership, they concluded, is the courage to stand and take no action until appropriate actions can be found.

How do Japan and the United States define environmental leadership? What impact will the policy stances of American and Japanese negotiators at UNCED have on United States-Japan relations?

What's at Stake for the U.S.- Japan Relationship?

As the Bush-Miyazawa summit in January 1992 revealed, both Japan and the United States are hopeful that environmental cooperation can serve as a basis for improved bilateral relations. If one begins to probe this by examining mutual perceptions, however, that hope begins to fade. According to Ronald Aqua, vice president of the U.S.-Japan Foundation, mutual perceptions between Americans and Japanese on environmental matters are generally not favorable and do little to mitigate the strain in U.S.-Japan relations. Japanese perceive Americans to be wasteful, unable to conserve, and even hypocritical: Americans "go around with a big stick telling others how to behave without looking in their own backyard." In the eyes of Americans, Japanese are "insensitive and self-serving," having ravaged the global commons by whaling and indiscriminate logging. These perceptions have contributed to a persistent level of misunderstanding and distrust between Americans and Japanese. But perceptions and interests are different and must be regarded as such, Aqua argued. Whether an erosion in perceptions will hurt U.S.-Japan relations in terms of real interests is difficult to ascertain.

A more tangible and more familiar issue at stake for the bilateral relationship, given the commercial opportunities of environmental technologies, is global competitiveness. What effect will environmental matters have on competition? Will it necessarily be healthy? How can two competing nations realistically both help themselves and serve the world simultaneously? Is cooperation possible or even necessary? If so, how can cooperative efforts be made more effective?

Despite the potential benefits to the world of growing American and Japanese interest in the environment, the environment threatens to devolve into a new point of contention for U.S.-Japan relations. At the time of the first Task Force meeting, some participants were particularly concerned about the implications of what appeared to be a higher level of environmental interest in Japan relative to the United States. "Japan is ready to completely rethink how its society, economy, and industry will function for a new environmental paradigm in a way that the United States is not," one American Task Force participant observed. This could lead to more serious conflict if the United States becomes disadvantaged competitively as a consequence; some participants argued that American resentment for Japan's environmental activity is already apparent. At the same time, Japan's willingness to play a more constructive role at UNCED was hampered by the more conservative stance of the United States. In many respects, Japan's ability to lead will be determined by how Japan manages the tensions between the consensus forming within the United Nations, its own internal consensus, and the position of its erstwhile mentor and principal global ally, the United States.

The alternative outcome is that a proactive Japan could, in the context of the competitive relationship, spur the United States into taking bolder action. The underlying competitiveness issues surrounding environmental threats point to the possibility that while the environmental challenge for the South (at least in the view of the North) is sustainable development through a balance of environmental protection and economic development, the immediate reality for the North is the challenge of balancing environmental protection

and sustained international competitiveness. Is there a danger in the search for opportunities to cooperate among Northern countries that the problems of the South will not be adequately assessed? Is there a consequent danger of the "consolidation of contentment,"[22] making it difficult if not impossible for developing country voices to be heard? Do Japan and the United States have the political will, in an era of increasing economic uncertainty, to sufficiently address the claims of the South? Where is it in the interest of the world—and, in the long run, for the United States and Japan—for the two countries to cooperate? Where is it necessary for there to be cooperation and consensus first between North and South? How far will international conferences like UNCED go in answering these questions? Where are more regional or bilateral fora more appropriate?

What's at Stake for Humanity?

In *Earth in the Balance*, Vice President Al Gore claims that the environment should be the organizing principle or rationale for foreign policy in the new world order, filling the international relations vacuum left by the East-West conflict. Is this a viable assumption, given what we know about the bitter realities of international politics, the weight of sovereignty in defining the playing field, and the saliency of the environment issue? Many Task Force participants asserted that the driving force behind the new world order is more than any single issue such as the environment, and even took issue with the very notion that there is a vacuum in international relations.

Among Task Force participants there was disagreement over the role of the environment in conceptualizing the new world order. Some saw the environment as the third leg, together with national security and trade, of a complex triad. Others did not view the environment as a discrete component of foreign policy. James Morley, professor emeritus of Columbia University, reminded the group that under the Kaifu administration, Japan had announced that its new foreign policy would consist of the promotion of democracy, market economy, human rights, and security. In the United States, Secretary of State James Baker, in discussing Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union, had declared that the United States was prepared to invite those countries into the community of nations, provided they "respect democracy, market economy, and human rights."

Although there is a common vocabulary it is no way clear that the ideological reasoning behind it is the same. How are concepts of democracy and human rights, sustainable development, and intergenerational equity defined by various actors? Are there significant differences between American and Japanese definitions? Given low voter turnout in the United States, the weakness of Japanese NGOs, and the frailty of democratic cultures in the former communist bloc, is democracy around the world functioning as well as it can? Simply because a political leader asserts that there is a new formula for international relations does not mean that the world is functioning that way, nor that people do not sense that a vacuum exists.

The world has long faced environmental and health disasters; why does the North find them so compelling now? asked Jesse Ausubel of Rockefeller University. To which he responded: because ultimately it is *meaning* that is at stake. The growth in concern for the environment

is directly related to the sophistication of technologies: having overcome the struggles of basic survival, human beings are compelled by a need for a new ethic to cope with a highly complex world that takes account of global realities made clear by scientific discovery. On the one hand, this need has led to the mainstreaming of environmentalism, or a widespread "green religion," emphasizing the establishment of a new relationship between human beings and the natural world. On the other hand, resistance to environmentalism remains equally strong: the undeniable reality is that sustainability for many means sacrifice and significant change in lifstyles and priorities.

The developed North and the developing South face markedly different challenges in the search for a sustainable world; scientific uncertainty over the precise nature of environmental damage only complicates the picture and leaves science vulnerable to political manipulation. Humanity's success in redressing the environmental crisis depends on its ability to act collectively to define and seek its common long-term interests, and on the ability of institutions to develop and implement policies in pursuit of those interests. The overriding determinants of American and Japanese policy, and that of all nations, are the reigning normative assumptions about the fundamentals of equity, political arrangements, and practices.

V

Japan and the United States: A Global Environmental Partnership?

The common perception of Japan's preeminence over the United States at Rio compared to twenty years ago at Stockholm requires further examination. How accurate is this perception? Will a new administration in the United States make a difference? How have recent changes in both perceptions and real interests of the United States and Japan affected the bilateral environmental relationship? Were there external factors that necessitated change or were there changes in internal political relationships among stakeholders? To what extent are Japanese and American approaches to environmental problems similar and different and how does this affect the overall bilateral relationship?

Yukio Okamoto, former Foreign Ministry official and president of Okamoto Associates, a consultancy specializing in U.S.-Japan relations, brought his experience to bear in assessing prospects for a global partnership. He began by focusing on the underlying causes for mutual doubt and suspicion between the U.S. and Japan. The friction began in the 1970s over trade imbalances and was exacerbated by failed remedies, including exchange rate adjustments and efforts to increase Japanese domestic demand. The two countries finally found the "right path" with the Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) of the late 1980s. This was a series of high level meetings aimed at addressing the economic, social and behavioral "structural" issues which were identified as the root of the problem: namely, an investment-savings ratio imbalance between Japan and the United States. Yet SII may have come too late, Okamoto warned. When the SII framework began, a revisionist movement was already underway in the United States that attributed the problem to the inherent nature of Japan; Japan was characterized by its American critics as operating by collusion between Japanese government and industry, predatory business practices, and unfairness.

In analyzing the cause of friction, Okamoto outlined collective attitudinal and social behavior of both countries that has contributed to tensions. The United States tends to paint other countries as simply either "good" or "bad." In the case of the Gulf War, Japan was "bad" in the minds of Americans because it did not send troops, even though Japanese households paid on average $300 each to help finance the war. Once a label of "good" or "bad" is applied, it is very difficult to change the mindset of Americans, Okamoto observed.

He added that the United States acts inconsistently on certain policies, particularly in the area of human rights. For example, the United States fiercely attacked the actions of the government of mainland China after the Tiananmen Square incident in June, 1989. (Critics believe that Japan should have responded more stringently to China's blatant human rights violation.) However, Okamoto argued, the United States does not apply its human rights policy to, for example, certain Middle Eastern countries with the same stringency.

Japan, on the other hand, suffers from what Okamoto terms "excessive relativism." Japan publicly subscribes to the liberal democratic concepts of freedom and democracy. But because Japan is a homogenous and stable society, these ideas, "received" during the American occupation, have not been challenged and therefore remain abstract in the minds of the people. The drawback for Japan is apparent in Japanese interactions with the outside world: Japan tends to wait for other nations to first make their decisions and then follows with "relativistic positioning."

Okamoto observed that Japan is also beset with the "cult of preserving the status quo"—the government's "obsession" with the status quo and consequent avoidance of taking strong positions. As a result, Japan has difficulty adapting to new situations. "Japanese government policies are like a convoy of ships," Okamoto explained, "where the speed of the convoy is adjusted to the speed of the slowest ship; Japan cannot, therefore, adjust quickly enough to the storm."

Finally, Okamoto argued, the nature of the Japanese market structure is partly to blame for the problems in the U.S.-Japan relationship. In Japan, the markets are geared for maximum profit at the micro level, where businesses compete aggressively for market share. Thus, the requirement for domestic market conditions is the aggressiveness of Japanese business abroad, which tends to exacerbate trade relations.

However belatedly, changes are taking place in Japan. First, Japan has come to understand the need to be more assertive. Second, the bureaucracy is getting wiser in terms of recognizing the need both to take determined and consistent positions and to swiftly implement policy. Third, regarding political leadership, there is a generational change taking place within the political stratum, which promises to challenge the status quo. Finally, the nature of corporate competition is changing. This is evident by the fact that Japanese businesses are paying attention to the well-propagated arguments of Sony chairman and business leader Akio Morita that Japan must adopt Western norms of doing business.

Ronald Aqua noted that in the post Cold-War era, while the United States' ability to stand on the international stage and credibly articulate universal normative standards is decreas-

ing, Japan's ability to propagate normative standards is increasing. That is, in international fora, what the Japanese have to say publicly is "becoming much more credible to non-Japanese and non-Americans than what Americans have to say." But the governing principles underlying what Japan says on that stage are not yet clear, and this could become problematic for Japan in its efforts to assert leadership. Recognizing the need for Japan to be more assertive internationally, Japanese intellectuals called for the "creation of new values," values that are a product of Japanese experience. In the words of Yukio Okamoto,

> "Obviously [in Japan] there are values like freedom, democracy, and justice.... But the problem of course is whether Japan is ready to fight for these values. Now I'm not talking about passive compliance to these values, but rather the active creation of values."[23]

It is clear that Japan's past experience with pollution alone does not automatically add up to environmental leadership; a commitment to a set of values which translates into internationalism is necessary. How does Okamoto's challenge resonate for most Japanese?

Some Japanese observers insist that "creating" new values in the environmentally conscious Japan of the 1990s means throwing off the cloak of Western values that produces a consumerist culture in exchange for a new ethic that incorporates other traditions. Implicit in this arguement is a revival of Lynn White's argument ("The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science*, March 10, 1967) that there is an inherent conflict between Christianity and environmentalism. To some extent it also contains a sense of lost Eastern values and a need to selectively uphold those values that can bring about a more sustainable society. The logical follow-on questions are: What is the currency of Eastern values vis-à-vis Western values and how can these be incorporated into a universally acceptable value system?

"Is it possible that either by virtue of luck or religion or economic hardship or isolation that the Japanese core value system places them at a competitive advantage to the North American value system in terms of achieving a formula for a sustainable world?" asked Tom Gladwin of New York University, who specializes in the role of business in the U.S.-Japan environment relationship. Do traditional values lie at the core of Japan's long-term perspective? To take Gladwin's question further: Does familial loyalty or ancestral worship or other aspects of a Confucian-Shinto-Buddhist culture make it easier for Japan to embrace an ethic of inter-generational equity? Japanese industry has already demonstrated a propensity for quality improvement and incremental progress in contrast to the American consumerist tradition of quantitative expansion and non-limitation. Are these static values, transcending all changes over time in material and political circumstance? Or are they dynamic values that indicate a predictable pattern of social and individual behavior across cultures?

In international fora there appears to be no hesitation in giving Japan the floor, as particularly apparent in the remarks of UNCED Secretary General Maurice Strong and others at the Eminent Persons Meeting held in Tokyo in April 1992.[24] Especially given its public commitment to preserving the environment, world expectations are high that Japan will assume a strong environmental leadership role by providing needed funds and technology.

Yet assessments of Japan's leadership effectiveness will depend upon how well its value judgements hold up under the scrunity of the outside world. In particular, how will its record on the inextricably-linked issues of civil liberties and human rights be judged?

Some traditional values derived from Confucianism, such as reverence for ancestors, may place Japan at a comparative advantage in accepting such complex principles as intergenerational equity; yet, it is unclear whether other other values that accompany this philosophy—an emphasis on hierarchal order and seniority—will serve Japan as well. A culture emphasizing top-down hierarchal values and a strong sense of collective rights over individual rights may bring about less public resistance to regulation and individual sacrifice. But then the burden of responsibility for translating environmental values into policy falls upon the bureaucrats at the top. Can the bureaucrats be relied upon to serve the ecological wishes of Japanese society? And will they uphold the integrity of a global environmental agenda? In the absence of a strong and effective Greens movement to challenge industry and promote an environmentalist agenda, what compels the Japanese government to address local issues, such as toxic and nuclear waste treatment and reduction? Do the answers to these questions portend a clash of Eastern and Western values?

Some Task Force participants observed that Japan's traditional top-down decision-making structure is inimical to environmentalism and ultimately stirs international criticism for Japanese environment and development policy. The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party leadership response to global environmental issues may be popular at home, but there is still a risk of continued conflict between Japan and the United States over environmental priorities. Without a visible element of democratic participation, the credibility of Japan's claim to leadership is diminished.

Americans maintain a strong conviction that social problems, such as the depletion of natural resources and pollution, need to be dealt with through democratic participation and by giving the public freedom of access to information. But recent history shows that even in the United States democracy often strays far from its ideal, as evident in the low voter turnout of national elections. A serious problem in the United States, as in other "democratic" societies, according to Carnegie Council President Robert Myers, is that the question of how virtuous citizens lead a good life is often obscured by a "preoccupation with gross national product and per capita earnings as the hallmark of the essential performance of the state."[25] Democracy also fails when the public is not adequately informed. Leaders in the United States, Japan and around the globe need to recognize an ethical responsibility to be honest in reporting what is and is not environmentally safe.

With the emergence of global environmental issues—the catapulting of the environment into the realm of foreign policy—the question of how democratic foreign policy is or should be further complicates the issue. This question has been raised by a number of American scholars in recent years, particularly on the issue of the nuclear arms policy: Should foreign policy be determined by citizens or is it the job of technocrats who have mastered the intricacies of throw weight, warheads, etc.?

In the realm of the global environment, who decides our policy toward climate change and

biodiversity? Are we seeing full democratic participation on these matters in the United States and elsewhere? The active participation of American ENGOs in the UNCED process was encouraging; but the fact that despite the relative strength of American ENGOs, the Bush administration played down UNCED and was steadfast in its more conservative posture throughout the negotiations either indicates a majority of citizens in favor of these policies, or a flawed democracy. Environmental education and public awareness could be another factor. One of the greatest dangers to democracy is that the more complex and technical the subject matter, the greater its susceptibility to reductionism by policy makers: in the case of the environment, jobs versus the environment. This view serves neither the economy, the environment, nor a nation's democratic purpose.

What are the requirements of a new global environmental ethic? What are the links between environment and democracy, its attendant freedoms, and the institutionalization of collective rights and how well are they understood by American and Japanese citizens and their political leaders? Are the moral traditions of the United States and Japan serving each country well today in the face of the environmental crisis? These are some of the fundamental questions that need to be considered before efforts to establish "goals" or "ends" of a U.S.-Japan partnership can be advanced.

VI

Conclusions

A U.S.-Japan environmental partnership is attractive and arguably needed for progress to be made in redressing the North-South environmental dilemma. Yet an initial review of the normative content of decision making begins to reveal the complexity of such a prospect. Some Task Force participants warned that the potential for conflict is greater than for cooperation. Nonetheless, it was agreed that there is a need for closer examination of policy positions on particular issues to determine the sources—ethical or political—of differences and similarities. The final session of the Task Force was underscored by two essential themes: 1) When is a single voice from the North desirable and when is it not? 2) Are the United States and Japan truly ready for a partnership, or are "consultation" and "coordination" more appropriate modes of managing the relationship?

Several of the participants concluded that the nation-state is becoming obsolete, and the power to act in international affairs is gradually falling to the private sector. They suggest that perhaps government is not the proper focus for an investigation of standard setting. Rather, it ought to be transnational, involving multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, scientists and policy experts; what Peter Haas, author of *Saving the Mediterranean* terms "epistemic communities."[26]

As Japan has added environmental considerations to economic considerations in decision making, it has also acknowledged the need to improve its capacity to make value judgments. Whether or not Japan is prepared to confront the U.S.-Japan relationship and directly challenge American environmental policies is still unclear. As Miwako Kurosaka of the World Resources Institute pointedly asserted, "Japan is asking itself, 'With whom should it

cooperate?' The first question really should be, 'What is the relationship for?' The answer to this question will determine 'with whom' Japan should cooperate." This observation holds true not only for Japan; honesty in determining the "ends" of a partnership is a prerequisite for both nations towards veritable environmental co-leadership.

This report was prepared by Joanne Bauer, Director of Japan Programs and the Environment Project, Carnegie Council.

Notes

[1] *Towards the Creation of an Environment-Friendly Culture: Final Report to the Environment Agency of Japan from the Advisory Panel on Environment and Culture*, April 1991, pp 7-13.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[3] The Earth Ethics Research Group in Florida, the Fifth Annual Cassassa Conference on Ecological Prospects in California, *Earth Ethics*, published in Washington, D.C., and the International Environmental Ethics Conference in Iowa.

[4] See Russell Hardin, "The Costs and Benefits of Future Generations," University of Chicago, 1991. In surveying the reigning political theories Hardin argues that they are inadequate in coping with the notion of future generations because it is an unspecified class. Many theories require a definition of the "party" which either "arouses our sympathies" or does something that creates "moral consideration."

[5] J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, eds., *Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy* . New York: State University of New York Press, 1989.

[6] Eugene C. Hargrove, *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989.

[7] Al Gore, *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992, p. 12.

[8] Joel Rosenthal's remarks to the Task Force, April 6, 1992.

[9] Task Force participant, speculating on the current popularity of the environmental issue.

[10] Robert Myers, "After the Cold War," *Society*, Transaction Publisher, Vol. 28, No. 3, March/April 1991, p. 32.

[11] Referring to Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, *The First Global Revolution: A Report by the Council of the Club of Rome* . New York: Pantheon Books, 1991.

[12] Comment by Task Force participant, April 6, 1992.

[13] Keidanren, "Keidanren Global Environment Charter," April 23, 1991, p. 1.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[16] The only international problem the Chamber mentions is global climate change, where its aim is the "prevention of ill-advised legislation that would needlessly hamper economic growth."

[17] See United States Council for International Business, "USCIB Work Plan 1990-1991," October 1990, p. 9; and the International Chamber of Commerce, "The Business Charter for Sustainable Development," April 1991.

[18] See also, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, *Japanese Scientific Monthly*, July 1991; and Joanne Bauer, "From Spaceship Japan to Spaceship Earth: Japan and the Global Environment," May 1990 (unpublished paper).

[19] In September 1989, the Japanese government played host to the "Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Responses Towards Sustainable Development."

[20] BNA, *International Environmental Reporter*, June 1989.

[21] Memorandum: Kankei Kyakuryo Kaigi, "Chikyu Kankyo Hozen in Kansuru Seisaku ni Tsuite," June 39, 1989.

[22] Quote by Task Force participant from a recent book by John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Politics of Contentment*.

[23] Yukio Okamoto, "The Internationalization of Japan: Progress at the Individual, Corporate and Government Levels," *Japan Programs Occasional Papers* 1, March 1991, p. 4.

[24] See especially the comments of Maurice F. Strong, secretary general of UNCED, "Eminent Persons' Meeting on Financing Global Environment and Development and Tokyo Declaration," April 1992.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[26] See Peter M. Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

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